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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY AS MORTGAGE
SECURITY IN MARYLANDt
By BRIDGEWATER M. ARNOLD*
The problem as to when a mortgage containing a pro-
vision that property, real or personal, to be acquired by
the mortgagor subsequent to the execution of a mortgage
will be recognized by the Courts as part of the mortgage
security is one that has greatly confounded students of
this subject, including the writer. One who undertakes to
navigate in this area of the law by such guiding stars as
reason and logic usually finds his confidence, and perhaps
his naivete, battered to pieces between the Scylla of the
common law and the Charybdis of equity.
We are all familiar with the old common law rule that
a man cannot make a present grant of what he does not
have. I cannot presently give you a title I do not have.
The leading case in Maryland and, apparently the
earliest, to deal with this situation is Hamilton v. Rogers.'
The earlier case of Hudson v. Warner' did not find it neces-
sary to consider the validity of an after-acquired property
clause as there was no evidence to show there was any
after-acquired property involved in the litigation. In
Hamilton v. Rogers one W, the mortgagor, purchased a
stock of goods from R, the mortgagee, for $5,314 on June 6,
1851 and the same day executed a mortgage bill of sale on
said stock to secure the purchase money. The mortgage in
addition to the usual provisions contained the additional
provision "together with all renewals and substitutions
for the same, or any part thereof; the object of this con-
veyance being to include, not only the articles at present
in said stores, but whatever may be at any time therein,
in the course of said W's business." W remained in posses-
sion until July, 1853, when he applied for the benefit of
the insolvent laws, the mortgage debt to R being still due
and unpaid. In July, 1854, H, a judgment creditor of W,
caused a writ of fi. fa. to be levied and the stock of W was
seized by the constable. Evidence indicated that of the
original stock only some buckles for trunks remained on
the premises when the constable seized the goods. R, the
t This article grew out of talks delivered in the fall of 1959 at the
Barristers' Club and at the Wranglers.
* Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland School
of Law, A.B., 1923, Princeton University; LL.B., 1931, University of Mary-
land.
28 Md. 301 (1855).
22 H. & G. 415 (Md. 1828).
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mortgagee, then sued H, the judgment creditor, and the
constable for trespass vi et armis to recover damages for
their seizure of the goods. The trustee in insolvency did
not appear in the case because apparently the mortgagee
had released the trustee and the mortgagor from liability.
The lower court held that the after-acquired goods were
subject to the mortgage and was reversed on appeal. Chief
Judge Le Grand said "does such a clause, in a mortgage of
goods and chattels, as that recited, give, at law, a right of
action to the mortgagee against anyone interfering with
the goods acquired by the mortgagor subsequently to the
execution of the mortgage?"
The Court quoted Justice Story, as follows: ' "to make
an assignment valid at law, the thing which is the subject
of it, must have an actual or potential existence at the
time of the grant or assignment." It was mentioned that
Justice Story was of the opinion that the cases do not
apply this principle to property acquired by the mortgagor
with the consent of the mortgagee, and in conformity with
the original agreement by a reinvestment of the proceeds
of the original property. The court stated that there was
not any evidence in the record that the proceeds of the
property in the store at the date of the mortgage were in-
vested in the goods levied upon by the mortgagor with
the avowed object of benefiting the mortgagees. "This
fact, in a certain aspect of the case in view of some of the
decisions, might have some influence. The rights of the
appellee (mortgagee) depend entirely upon the language
of his deed." The fact that proceeds from the sale of mort-
gaged goods are reinvested in future goods it was decided,
less than two years later, in a suit in equity by the same
judge,4 did not make the future goods subject to the earlier
mortgage when an execution creditor filed a creditor's bill
to satisfy his judgment after the judgment creditor had a
writ of fi. fa. issued and levied.
In the Hamilton v. Rogers case, the Court also held
that if the mortgagee left the present goods in the posses-
sion of the mortgagor and these goods became commingled
with after-acquired goods, the mortgagee had the burden
of proving which of the goods were the present goods and
if the goods could not be separated or identified, the rights
of third parties ought not to be affected thereby, whatever
might be the influence of such commingling as between
the original parties to the mortgage.
B Supra, n. 1, 315.
'Rose v. Bevan, 10 Md. 466 (1857).
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In Crocker v. Hopps,5 we again have a case where an
individual executed a mortgage on certain chattels with
an agreement that the mortgagor could sell or exchange
the mortgaged chattels and that they should be replaced
by others of like character and value and the latter should
be subject to the mortgage. After the mortgagor was
adjudged insolvent under the state insolvency law the
mortgagee, claiming title under the mortgage, took posses-
sion of some of the subsequently acquired chattels and
sold them. The trustee in insolvency sued the mortgagee
for conversion. The Court referred to Hamilton v. Rogers
and stated that no title or right of possession of such after-
acquired chattels passed to the mortgagee. The Court also
said that the mortgagee's plea of ownership of such chat-
tels would seem to be in direct conflict with the express
language of Article 21, Section 406 that "no personal prop-
erty of any description whatever, whereof the vendor,
mortgagor or donor shall remain in possession shall
pass ......
To the mortgagee's plea that the after-acquired prop-
erty became subject to a lien enforceable in equity and
that by reason of Article 83, Section 757 of the Code allow-
ing defenses on equitable grounds this equitable lien could
be asserted in this case at law as a defense, the Court
stated that assuming without admitting that defendant
has such a lien he cannot enforce it or rely on it in this
case because whatever lien he might have he must enforce
such lien, if at all, in the insolvency court.
The United States District Court for Maryland sitting
in bankruptcy,8 in reliance on Maryland decisions9 , held
that a mortgage of after-acquired stock in trade executed
by an individual mortgagor was void. In this decision Judge
Rose also said:
"In Maryland, the mortgage is powerless to create
a lien upon after-acquired property. Furthermore in
the latter state a mortgage in which the mortgagor re-
serves the right to sell for his own benefit the property
mortgaged is void, as tending to delay, hinder, or de-
fraud creditors. There is no such a covenant in the
'78 Md. 260, 28 A. 99 (1893).
0 MD. CODE (1888), now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 41.
7MD. CODE (1888), now MD. RULE (1958) 342 d.
8Clark v. Grimes, 232 F. 190 (1916).
1 First National 'Bank v. Lindenstruth, 79 Md. 136, 28 A. 807 (1894)
Edelhoff v. Ho)rner-Miller Mfg. Co., 86 Md. 595, 39 A. 314 (1898).
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mortgage before the court but for years the parties
acted as if there had been. What they did is at least
as important as what they said."
When this case went up to the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals1" Judge Knapp wrote the opinion and in the course of
it said:
"Nor on the whole are we persuaded that the
equities of Grimes (mortgagee) are superior to those
of other creditors. He was bound to know that under
Maryland law his mortgage would not be a lien upon
or give him any right to seize the goods afterwards
purchased by Baker; and dealers who sold to Baker on
credit were presumably aware that the supplies they
furnished would not be subject to Grimes' mortgage."
It is to be noted that this mortgage was recorded. The
court ruled that the mortgagee by taking possession of the
after-acquired stock on which he had no lien had received
a voidable preference.1
An exception to the common law rule that one could
not make a present transfer of future acquired property
developed with variations in the case of future crops. This
is frequently referred to as the doctrine of potential exist-
ence. It would appear to stem from the old English case of
Grantham v. Hawley 2 where, in discussing a grant of corn
to be grown in the future upon land owned by the grantor,
the Court is reported to have said:
"And though the lessor had it not actually in him,
nor certain, yet he had it potentially; for the land is
the mother and root of all fruits. Therefore he that
hath it may grant all fruits that may arise upon it
after, and the property shall pass as soon as the fruits
are extant, ..... "
Although the writer has found no case of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals that refers to or directly applies
the doctrine of potential existence, the United States Dis-
trict Court for Maryland sitting in bankruptcy" seems to
have made application of this doctrine. In this case the
10 Grimes v. Clark, 234 F. 604 (4th Cir. 1916).
n For a recent case to the same effect, see Weiprecht v. Rupple, 217 Md.
337, 143 A. 2d 62 (1958).
' Com. P1. 1616, Hobart 132; 80 Eng. Reprint 281 (1616).
IIn re Cook, 9 F. Supp. 764 (1935).
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bankrupt, to secure the purchase price of some fertilizer,
gave the creditor a bill of sale of "one-half of his wheat
then being, standing and growing or to be planted during
the year 1931" upon the farm. The referee denied the
creditor a lien on the future crop, largely relying on
Grimes v. Clark4 referred to above. The District Court
in overruling the referee distinguished the Grimes case
because it dealt with future goods but not future crops,
and said:
"We do not, however, consider that this decision is
conclusive of the precise point here at issue any more
than are the Maryland decisions above referred to...
because in Grimes v. Clark future crops were not in
issue, but stock in trade. In short, we do not find any
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the cir-
cuit or of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, or of this
court, which purports to classify future crops with
after-acquired property which, unlike future crops, is
not the natural product or the expected increase of
something already belonging to the vendor or the
mortgagor. On the contrary, we believe that this dis-
tinction is intended to be made in the case of Ober v.
Keating, 77 Md. 100 .... "
It is true that Ober v. Keating involved a mortgage of
future crops, but the court set up an equitable lien superior
to creditors on purely equitable principles with no men-
tion and presumably without any consideration of the doc-
trine of potential existence.
There is probably no branch of the law in which the
common law has talked and gone in one direction and at
the same time equity has blissfully talked and gone in the
other direction more than in the development of mortgage
law. And this observation certainly applies to mortgages of
after-acquired property. As early as 1855, Maryland's lead-
ing case on this problem, Hamilton v. Rogers," while re-
fusing at law to recognize a mortgage on after-acquired
property in a contest between the mortgagee and an execu-
tion creditor of the mortgagor, made reference to Justice
Story and the landmark case of Mitchell v. Winslow."6
The Court pointed out that this case was in equity and
said that the whole reasoning of Judge Story was to show
that whatever might be the rule at law, nevertheless
- Grimes v. ClArk, 234 F. 604 (4th Cir. 1916).
158 Md. 301, 319 (1855).
1"2 Sto. 630 (1843, Story's United States Circuit Court Reports).
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equity will attach its jurisdiction whenever the parties by
their contract, intend to create a positive lien or charge,
either upon real or personal property, whether it is in esse
or not; that it attaches in equity as a lien or charge upon
the particular property as soon as the assignor or contrac-
tor acquires a title thereto against the latter, and all per-
sons asserting a claim thereto under him. But, said the
Court of Appeals, with this doctrine we have nothing to
do in the present instance.
Rose v. Bevan" involved the situation where one G,
mortgagor, executed a mortgage to R, mortgagee, of all the
stock in trade and household and kitchen furniture in the
house and store occupied by the mortgagor "and also other
property and effects which may hereafter be brought into
said building by the mortgagor, or may be substituted by
him in lieu of that hereby mortgaged." Complainant, a
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, had writs of fi. fa.
issued and levy made and then filed a creditor's bill in
equity to subject the debtor's property to the satisfaction
of his judgment. The case was decided on bill and answer.
The Court in upholding the judgment creditor's right to
have the property sold to satisfy his judgment said the bill
denies that the property levied upon is the same as that
covered by the mortgage. If it be not the same, then to
the extent of the difference, the mortgagee has no right to
interfere, or, if any portion be the result of the purchases
made out of the proceeds of sale of the goods mortgaged,
he has no right, as to such portion to interfere, he having
no interest in, or lien on, the same, and cited Hamilton v.
Rogers.8 It is to be noted here that this decision grew
out of a case in equity and yet the Court relied on a pre-
vious case that grew out of a case at law in denying that
the after-acquired property was subject to the mortgage
lien.
In First National Bank v. Lindenstruth"9 an individual
executed a mortgage on his present and after-to-be-
acquired stock of goods to a brewing company as mort-
gagee. Complainant was a judgment creditor of the mort-
gagor who had a fi. fa. issued and returned nulla bona
and then filed a creditor's bill in equity to set aside the
mortgage as a fraudulent conveyance. The lower court
dismissed the bill and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Court held there was no evidence of fraud and then said
"7 10 Md. 466 (1857).
I8 Supra, n. 15.
13979 Md. 136, 28 A. 807 (1894).
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the clause in the mortgage undertook to make provision
for subjecting after-acquired stock in trade to the lien of
the mortgage. It continued:
"But such a provision, whilst not of itself render-
ing the mortgage void, as fraudulent, is at law simply
a nullity. It is the settled doctrine of the Maryland
courts that a provision such as this in an ordinary
mortgage creates no lien at law on after-acquired prop-
erty .... There are conditions under which a cove-
nant like this would be held valid in equity, but they
are not presented here."2
There being no impediment to execution by fi. fa. at law,
the Court held the bill was properly dismissed.
Again in Solter v. MacMillan' in a foreclosure pro-
ceeding the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court in
holding that although the mortgage purported to cover
all other property, real, personal and mixed, which the
mortgagor company may hereafter acquire, that only such
after-acquired property as became fixtures was subject to
the mortgage and other after-acquired property such as
furniture and office equipment was not subject to the mort-
gage. It is to be noted that the foreclosure must neces-
sarily have been a proceeding in equity.
Apparently the first Maryland case to uphold a mort-
gage of after-acquired property was Butler v. Rahm.22 In
October, 1871, the Worcester and Somerset Railroad Co.,
mortgagor, as authorized by its charter23 issued $50,000 in
bonds secured by a mortgage, apparently in the form of a
deed of trust. The charter authorized the company to
pledge "its property and profits."24 The court felt that the
deed by a reasonable construction did no more. It con-
veyed "all the present and future to be acquired property
of the company and all its estate and franchises, that is to
say, "25 and then follows an enumeration of the property
and rights intended to be conveyed. The Court said this
enumeration limits and explains the previous words, and
brings the terms of the deed within the limits of the
legislative authority. The deed contained the following
provision:
-Ibid., 140.
21 147 Md. 580, 128 A. 356 (1925).
=46 Md. 541 (1877).
' MD. LAWS 1867, Ch. 322, § 15.
Supra, n. 22, 547.
Supra, n. 22, 547.
[VOL. XIX
1959] AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY LIENS 301
".. . but nothing herein contained shall prevent the
said company, before default in the payment of any
of the said bonds, or the interest due thereon, from
selling, hypothecating, or otherwise disposing of any
of their said property, real or personal, not necessary
in their judgment for the use of the said road, nor
from collecting or applying any money due to the said
company from any source whatever, provided said
application shall not be to the prejudice of any holder
of any of the said bonds."26
Complainant, a bondholder, filed a bill in equity to en-
join a judgment creditor from enforcing an execution on
the railroad property. The lower court granted the in-
junction and the judgment creditor appealed. In an opinion
written by Chief Judge Bartol the lower court was
affirmed. To the contention that the proviso in the mort-
gage permitting the mortgagor to sell the mortgaged prop-
erty was fraudulent and invalidated the deed, the Court
said:
"In answer to this objection we fully concur in the
opinion of the learned Judge of the Circuit Court, and
cannot do better than to repeat what has been so well
said by him: 'However suspicious the power here
given might be in the case of a mortgage of ordinary
goods, the very nature of this corporation, its busi-
ness, the means and power necessary to keep it up, the
wear and tear of its iron, ties and rolling stock, the
constant necessity of replacing injured or worn-out
appurtenances with new, forbids the inference of a
fraudulent purpose, which might arise from such a
provision under other circumstances. The power re-
tained is manifestly in the interest of the mortgagees,
and is restricted by express language to be exercised
in such manner as not to prejudice in any manner the
rights of the bondholders. If the provision is in the in-
terest of the bondholders, as it transparently is, it is
also for the same reasons in the interest of the other
creditors, and cannot be regarded as fraudulent'."27
The Court then went on:
"It is next objected that the mortgage attempts to
convey 'future to be acquired property', but this objec-
tion is not tenable.
Supra, n. 22, 547.
Supra, n. 22, 547.
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"While it is well settled that a party cannot convey
subsequently to be acquired goods, so as to give the
mortgagee a legal title thereto, or a legal right of
action against a party seizing them, as was decided in
Hamilton v. Rogers, 8 Md. 301, yet it has frequently
been decided that such a conveyance creates in equity
a valid lien upon property subsequently acquired (cit-
ing out of state cases). The mortgage is, in our judg-
ment, free from objection in its terms and provisions;
it was made with the legislative sanction, and appears
to be in all respects such a contract as was con-
templated and authorized by the charter of the com-
pany. ' 28
It is to be noticed in this case that the case was brought
into equity by a bondholder (mortgagee) to enjoin an
effort by a judgment creditor to execute on the mortgagor's
property, whereas in the Lindenstruth case,2 the case came
into equity by a judgment creditor filing a creditor's bill
after he had already had issued a fi. fa. and had it returned
nulla bona. In both cases the equity case followed the
execution at law. In the Rahm case the court said that the
mortgage on after-acquired property created a lien in
equity and held there was a lien, whereas in the Lindens-
truth case the common law rule was applied that a party
cannot create at law a mortgage on after-acquired property,
although the court mentioned that such a lien might be
created in equity and cited the Rahm case. On the facts,
the mortgagor in the Lindenstruth case was an individual
and in the Rahm case was a railroad corporation. There
was no statutory authority for such a mortgage in the
Lindenstruth case and the after-acquired property was
stock in trade acquired for the purpose of resale whereas
the Court particularly pointed out that the after-acquired
property in the Rahm case was not stock in trade acquired
for the purpose of resale even though the mortgagor was
permitted to sell the mortgaged property. Is the key to
the decision in the Rahm case the legislative authority, the
fact that the mortgagor was a railroad corporation, or the
nature of the property which was the subject of the after-
acquired property clause?
Another case upholding a mortgage on after-acquired
property was Brady v. Johnson 0 Here the property of a
Supra, n. 22, 548.
79 Md. 136, 28 A. 807 (1894).
75 Md. 445, 26 A. 49 (1892).
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Canal Company was under the control of the equity court to
sell the property to satisfy mortgage bonds, and receivers
were appointed. Judgment creditors then caused execu-
tions to be levied on certain real property31 in Cumberland
owned and used by the Canal Company. A petition was
then filed by the trustees in court for an injunction to re-
strain the executions. It appears that under the Act of
1834, chapter 241, the State loaned the Canal Company
the sum of $2,000,000 to be used in the construction of the
canal upon the pledge as security for the loan, of "the
whole of the net revenues of said company, and the whole
of the water rights, lands, and other property at any time
acquired by the said company, or the rents or other avails
thereof." Pursuant thereto the mortgage was made of "all
and singular the lands and tenements, capital stock, estates
and securities, goods and chattels, property and rights, now
or at any time hereafter to be acquired...."
It was argued that part of the property levied upon
was not embraced by the mortgages as it was acquired by
the Canal Company in 1878 under a purchase money mort-
gage. Chief Judge Alvey sitting in the lower court upheld
the mortgage on the after-acquired property and enjoined
the execution creditors. To the creditors' argument the
court said:
such position is wholly untenable. The pur-
chase of the property, though not fully paid for, and
though the legal estate was and is still vested by the
mortgage in the vendors, or their assignee, placed the
property in the possession of the Canal Co., and
vested the equitable estate and right of redemption in
the company; and that interest was at once covered by
1 Because of the provisions of the Maryland Code (Vol. 2), unless proper
recording steps are taken it is most doubtful that any force would be given
to an after-acquired property clause as reglards land subsequently acquired
outside of the Jurisdiction where the original mortgage is recorded. Art. 21,
Sec. 1, in part provides:
"No estate of inheritance or freehold, or any declaraltin or limita-
tion of use, or any estate above seven years, shall pass or take effect
unless the deed conveying the same shall be executed, acknowledged
and recorded as herein provided;.
Art. 21, Sec. 10, In part provides:
"Every deed of any of the interests or estates mentioned in § 1 of
'this Article shall be recorded within six months from its date, in the
county or city in which the land affected, by such deed lies; and where
it lies in more than one county, or in the City of Baltimore and a
county, it shall be recorded In all the counties and the said city in
which such land lies."
Art. 21, See. 29, provides:
"Deeds of mortgage conveying any use, estate, or Interest in land
shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as absolute deeds of
the same."
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the previous mortgages to the State. For it is now well
settled that a mortgage with the 'after-acquired prop-
erty' clause in it, embraces a charge upon all the prop-
erty subsequently acquired by the corporation mort-
gagor which comes within the description in the mort-
gage; and this, not only as to property to which the
mortgagor acquires the legal title, but also as to that
to which it acquires only an equitable title .... The
mortgage lien, however, upon the subsequently ac-
quired property only attaches from the time of the
acquisition by the mortgagor, and subject to all pre-
existing liens thereon .... It is clear, therefore, that
the State's liens embrace all the property levied on by
the sheriff."32
On appeal, a per curiam opinion stated that Chief Judge
Alvey had so fully considered and discussed the case that
it need not be restated and affirmed the lower court.
It is to be again noted that in this case the mortgagor
was a corporation and supposedly a public utility and that
there was statutory authority for the mortgage. Also in
this case the after-acquired property clause was held to
cover the mortgagor's equitable interest in after-acquired
real property.
In Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,"3 the Gas Company
in 1904 executed a mortgage to a trustee by which it con-
veyed all the property it then owned and all that it might
thereafter acquire to secure the payment of bonds. Con-
cerning the mortgage of after-acquired property, the Court
in the course of its opinion said:
"The recent cases generally hold that railroad and
other corporations have the power to mortgage future
acquired property and that in such cases as soon as the
property is acquired by the mortgagor company the
lien of the mortgage will be regarded in equity as
fastening upon it."34
Here again it is to be noted that we have a corporate mort-
gagor that is a public utility, as in the two previous cases
of Butler v. Rahm, 3 and Brady v. Johnson.6 However, the
Court's actual language does not confine the power to only
Supra, n. 30, 454.
112 Md. 50, 75 A. 517 (1910).
-Ibid., 72.
"46 Md. 541 (1877).
75 Md. 445, 26 A. 49 (1892).
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public utility corporations but says "railroad and other
corporations." Although the opinion does not cite any
special legislative enactment authorizing mortgaging of
after-acquired property such as was present in the previous
two cases, undoubtedly the mortgage was executed pur-
suant to authority in the corporate charter which should
serve the same purpose.
In R. E. Duvall Co. v. Washington B.&A. Electric R.
Co.37 it was claimed that certain after-acquired property
was subject to the mortgage executed by the Railway Com-
pany to secure certain bonds. It was decided on a con-
struction of the language in the mortgage that some after-
acquired real estate was subject to the mortgage and it
was said:
"It is obvious that the language of this concluding
paragraph, taken by itself, is sufficiently broad to in-
clude shares of stock which the trustee now claims.
And it may be conceded for the purposes of this case
that a railroad may mortgage after-acquired prop-
erty . . . and that there is no reason for applying to
securities any other or different rule as to after-ac-
quired property than is applied to other kinds of prop-
erty. United States Mtge. & Trust Co. v. Chicago & A.
R.R. Co." 38
However, on a construction of the mortgage agreement and
other matters the Court decided that the shares of stock
were not intended to be included in the mortgage.
Are we to conclude then, that if the mortgagor be a cor-
poration, whether a public utility or not, it can execute a
mortgage of after-acquired property that will be recog-
nized by the Courts? Let us look at a federal case, Mallory
v. Maryland Glass Co.,3 9 which involved a private corpora-
tion engaged in the business of manufacturing glass bottles.
B held a mortgage that covered the plant, fixtures, etc.,
and also provided:
"And also all the property, real, personal, and
mixed, of the said Maryland Glass Company, now
owned by said company, or hereafter to be acquired by
it, together with all improvements thereon, and all
rights and appurtenances appertaining thereto."40
51 F. 2d 566 (D.C. Md. 1931).
840 F. 2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1930).
131 F. 111 (D.C. Md. 1904).
Ibid., 112.
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The Glass Company went into a consent receivership
and the question was whether about $2000 worth of glass
bottles manufactured after the mortgage was executed
were subject to the mortgage lien as against general credi-
tors claiming in the receivership. Judge Morris held that
the glass bottles were not subject to the mortgage, and,
among other things said:
"The ground upon which a recorded mortgage of
after-acquired property is held effective in equity,
although a nullity at law, has been stated to be:
"'That whenever the parties by their contract in-
tend to create a positive lien or charge either upon real
or upon personal property, whether then owned by
the assignor or contractor or not, or, if personal prop-
erty, whether it is then in esse or not, it attaches in
equity as a lien or charge upon the particular prop-
erty as soon as the assignor or contractor acquires a
title thereto against the latter, and against all persons
asserting a claim thereto under him, either voluntarily
or with notice or in bankruptcy.' Mitchell v. Winslow,
2 Story 630, 644, Fed. Cas. No. 9,673.
"This doctrine has been applied in numberless cases
in equity, but most frequently in cases of mortgages
to secure bonds issued by railroad and canal com-
panies and similar quasi public corporations, where
the dismemberment of the enterprise by seizing and
separating any part of the after-acquired property
which has been added to the original equipment in
order to make it more efficient would interfere with
the performance of its quasi public functions. Such
added chattels and augmentation of the plant might
almost be presumed to be included in the words of the
general grant. The present case is that of a private
manufacturing corporation. The glassware manufac-
tured by it must have been intended to have been sold.
The object of the company and its plant, and the enter-
prise which the mortgagee assisted by his loan of
money, was to produce glassware as a commercial
article for immediate sale in the regular course of
business. In considering the language of the clause of
the mortgage now under consideration, so far as the
after-acquired glassware is concerned, we start with
the fact that the glassware was intended to be sold
as produced, and was not intended to be added to the
[VOL. XIX
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plant, either in augmentation of its efficiency, or in
substitution of machinery or implements worn out and
necessary to be kept up, or to in any way increase the
permanent value of the plant. With this idea in mind
as to the supposed subject-matter of this clause of the
mortgage as indicating the intention of the parties, we
are to consider whether the language used indicates an
intention that the glassware was to be subject to the
lien of the mortgage.
"It is only because, as between the parties, their
clear intention and express contract is permitted to
govern, notwithstanding its invalidity at law, that in
equity the lien on after-acquired property is upheld.
It is in the nature of compelling specific performance
of a contract, and, to be entitled to favorable considera-
tion, its terms should be free from ambiguity.
"... it is only equitable that if a mortgage which
asserts a right expressly denied at law, and the effect
of which, as to the goods produced for immediate sale
would be so contrary to the intended and actual deal-
ings under it, and which is so markedly in derogation
of the rights of creditors, who give credit to the fac-
tory on the expectation of its paying its current bills
for supplies out of the unrestricted current sales of its
product, is to be upheld in equity because of the in-
tention of the parties to the mortgage, the language in
which the mortgage lien on such goods is attempted to
be given should be unmistakable."'41
The opinion of Judge Morris is interesting because it
reflects the view that mortgages of after-acquired property
are upheld in equity when the mortgagor is a quasi public
utility corporation and yet it does not close the door to such
mortgages being upheld if the corporate-mortgagor is not
a public utility. The opinion seems to finally make the
test - what did the parties intend to contract for? If the
intent is clear to subject after-acquired property to the
mortgage then equity will enforce such intent if clearly
expressed. Here the Court refused to find such intent,
hinting, it seems to the writer, that to subject to the mort-
gage after-acquired property which is to be the merchan-
dise which will be held out for sale, would in effect be a
fraud on creditors. One wonders, if the language in the
mortgage had specifically named the bottles to be manu-
*x Supra, . 39, 113-114.
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factured in the future, whether or not the Court would
have upheld such a provision against the claims of com-
peting creditors?
Up to this point it looks as if the only mortgages on
after-acquired property which have been upheld have
been those executed by corporations and particularly pub-
lic utility corporations. However, Ober v. Keating,42 would
seem to explode this theory. In this case L, a landlady,
and T, L's tenant, purchased $500 worth of phosphate from
X and agreed to give X a chattel mortgage on a wheat
crop about to be seeded to secure payment of the $500.
The mortgage was executed by T, but not by L, and was
never recorded. Subsequently L made a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors to T of all her property
including her interest in the wheat. X filed a bill claiming
an equitable lien on the wheat crop. The Court held that X
would have a lien as against the assignee for the benefit
of creditors, saying:
"It is a familiar principle, that an agreement to give
a mortgage, founded on a valuable consideration, will
be treated in equity as a mortgage. It will be so treated,
for the reason that equity will regard that as done
which the parties themselves have agreed shall be
done. And, if so, then his assignees stand in no better
position."
It is to be noted here that the mortgagor was not a cor-
poration but an individual and also that the mortgagor had
never actually executed a mortgage on the future crop but
only agreed to do so. Also the Court in this case did not
refer to the doctrine of potential existence as its basis for
creating the lien. A subsequent case in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, In re Cook,4 also involved an individual execut-
ing a mortgage of a future wheat crop by the vehicle of a
bill of sale. The court in this latter case, relying on Ober
v. Keating, upheld such a mortgage unless it could be
shown that creditors claiming in bankruptcy had extended
credit to the mortgagor in the interval between the execu-
tion of the bill of sale and its recording. In upholding such
a mortgage the court distinguished this case from other
cases which struck down mortgages on a future stock
of goods.
- 77 Md. 100, 26 A. 501 (1893).
"9 F. Supp. 764 (D.C. Md. 1935).
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To the rule prohibiting mortgages of after-acquired
property at law, there are what might possibly be consid-
ered exceptions. These possible exceptions grow out, how-
ever, not of principles of mortgage law, but other prin-
ciples of law and should not be confused with the general
problem we are discussing. When a thing is added to an-
other thing by way of accession, natural or artificial, so
as to become a part thereof, in the view of the law, it is
subject to the previous mortgage upon the thing to which
it is added. This occurs when a house is built upon mort-
gaged land, or articles of machinery are attached to a mort-
gaged building, so as to become a part thereof, these being
applications of the principles of fixtures.44 In Solter v.
MacMillan,4 a mortgage conveyed all the real estate of
the mortgagor and also all the machinery, equipment and
fixtures in said buildings and structures which it may
hereafter acquire. Foreclosure proceedings were instituted
and among the property sold were items that were ac-
quired by the mortgagor after the execution of the mort-
gage. These items were classified as (1) fixtures and (2)
furniture and office equipment. The Court held the fixtures
subject to the mortgage but not the furniture and office
equipment, saying:
"It remains to consider the objection that these
articles were installed after the date of the mortgage,
and were not intended to be substituted for worn out
or broken original parts. That would be a valid objec-
tion if the appellee's (trustee in bankruptcy for the
mortgagor) rights depended upon the attempt in the
mortgage to convey future acquired chattels. Such
provision has no validity and no effect, except as it
may have a bearing upon the intent as to the perma-
nent use of such articles in connection with the work
of the factory.
"So that, having decided that the articles in con-
troversy were fixtures, it makes no difference whether
they were installed before or after the execution of
the mortgage, any more than would the time of the
erection of a building on mortgaged property. ' '46
It. is to be noted here, that, although the mortgage by
its express terms intended to cover future-acquired equip-
"TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1903) 1173.
4 147 Md. 580, 128 A. 356 (1925).
-Ibid., 587.
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ment, the court refused to hold that the pieces of equip-
ment which were not fixtures were covered by the mort-
gage. Also, that the after-acquired pieces of equipment
were apparently not chattels or merchandise held by the
mortgagor for purposes of resale.
Again in Credit Co. v. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.47 the owners
of a parcel of land, which was subject to a mortgage, had
a garage erected on the land. The contractor who built the
garage, in order to secure payment to himself, took a
mortgage on the property, and it was further agreed that
title to the garage, regardless of in what degree it was an-
nexed to the realty, should not pass to the landowners
until the mortgage notes were paid. A paper purporting
to be a memorandum of the contract was filed under the
conditional sale recording statute. In a contest over the
garage between the original mortgagee, who incidentally
had no after-acquired property clause in his mortgage, and
the conditional vendor-contractor, the court upheld the
claim of the original mortgagee of the realty on the ground
that the garage had become so incorporated as a fixture in
the realty as to become a part of it and that it could not
be removed without material injury to the real estate. The
Court said that the provision in the conditional sale con-
tract was not binding on the original mortgagee unless he
consented to it.48
Another possible exception to the rule prohibiting mort-
gages of after-acquired property which grows out, not of
principles of mortgage law, but another principle of law,
involves the natural increase of a mortgaged chattel.
In a case decided in 1836 there was a mortgage of
several female slaves and other property to secure a debt
of $794. Nothing was said in the instrument about the
issue of the female slaves. After default but while the
mortgagor was still in possession of the parents, issue was
born and the mortgagor sold and delivered possession of
the issue to a purchaser for a valuable consideration. On
foreclosure the mortgagee claimed the issue was subject to
the mortgage. The lower court held for the purchaser but
was reversed on appeal. The appellate court49 decided that
the issue was subject to the mortgage. In the course of its
opinion the Court said:
S160 Md. 230, 153 A. 64 (1931).
18 Arnold, Conditional Sales of Chattels in Maryland, 1 Md. L. Rev. 187,
207-211 (1937).
" Evans & Iglehart v. Merriken, 8 G. & J. 39 (Md. 1836).
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".... right and justice require, that the issue so born
should be liable, and that neither the principles of law
or equity forbid it. * * *
".... the title of the mortgagee had become absolute at
law when the issue was born. In a Court of law there-
fore, his title to the mother had then become absolute
and indefeasible, and he must of course be entitled at
law to her offspring born during such his title, subject
to the equitable right of the mortgagor to redeem in
equity on the payment of the mortgage debt."50
Happy with its decision the court continued:
"We will only remark in conclusion, that we are
happy to find that in this instance, the law of the land,
and the law of nature, so far from being at variance,
are in perfect harmony; and that whilst on the one
hand, full and ample justice will be administered to
the honest creditor, the claims and feelings of nature
will not be violated on the other.""'
It has been said of this case that it "... was argued
before a very full Court"."
Another case involving natural increase, but this time
of animals, was decided in 1887.11 In 1877 a tenant on a
farm executed a chattel mortgage including "fifteen shoats"
to secure payment of a debt due January, 1879, to his land-
lord as mortgagee, which was duly recorded, and the mort-
gagor remained in possession of the mortgaged property.
While the debt was still unpaid, a judgment creditor of the
mortgagor had the sheriff levy, among other things, upon
seven large shoats. Before the sheriff's sale the mortgagee
gave notice to the sheriff and the bidders that he claimed
these shoats under the mortgage as the increase of the
originally mortgaged shoats. The shoats were the increase
of the original shoats but not the immediate increase. The
sheriff sold these shoats to the judgment creditor who then
brought an action of replevin against the mortgagee. The
creditor as plaintiff asked the lower court to instruct the
jury that he was entitled to recover, if the jury found these
hogs were the increase of the immediate offspring of the
fifteen shoats, which immediate offspring were littered in
-oIbid., 48.
Supra, n. 49, p. 49.
Cahoon v. Miers, 67 Md. 573, 577, 11 A. 278 (1887).
Ibid.
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1878, before default in the mortgage. This instruction was
rejected by the lower court and defendant mortgagee had
judgment below. In affirming the lower court in holding
that the offspring of the originally mortgaged shoats were
subject to the mortgage, the Court of Appeals, among other
things, quoted from Domat's Civil Law by Strahan, sec-
tion 1663:
"'Although the mortgage be restricted to certain
things, yet it will nevertheless extend to all that shall
arise or proceed from that thing which is mortgaged,
or that shall augment it or make part of it. Thus when
a stud of horses, a herd of cattle, or a flock of sheep
is put in pawn into the creditor's hands, the foals, the
lambs and other beasts which they bring forth, and
which augment their number, are likewise engaged for
the creditor's security. And if the whole herd or flock
be entirely changed, the heads which have renewed it
are engaged in the same manner as the old stock'. 54
This case would seem to be authority for the fact that not
only the original animals are subject to the mortgage but
the immediate and not-immediate offspring are likewise
subject to the lien. Whether or not there is any limitation
as to how many generations this may be carried is not men-
tioned. If there is no limitation, it would be fascinating to
see what would happen if there was a debt payable in fifty
years secured by a mortgage on a pair of rabbits.
Up to this point can we, on the basis of the above dis-
cussion, show any definite criteria as to when mortgages of
after-acquired property will be upheld? Let us see.
Will such a mortgage be upheld if the mortgage shows
a clear intent to subject certain after-acquired property to
the mortgage as suggested in Mallory v. Maryland Glass
Co.55 Not necessarily, as is evidenced by Solter v. Mac-
Millan," and other cases where such an intent seemed
clear.
Will mortgages of after-acquired property only be up-
held if the mortgagor is a public utility corporation? Not
necessarily, as is indicated in Mallory v. Maryland Glass
Co., and also Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. 7
Will such a mortgage only be upheld if the mortgagor
is a corporation and not an individual? Not necessarily;
Supra, n. 52, 579.
131 F. 111 (D.C. Md. 1904) ; see supra, circa n. 38.
147 Md'. 580, 128 A. 356 (1925) ; see 8upra, circa n. 45.
112 Md. 50, 75 A. 517 (1910) ; see supra, circa n. 33.
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the mortgagor in Ober v. Keating," was an individual and
the court upheld a mortgage on future crops on equitable
principles.
Will such a mortgage on after-acquired goods only be
held invalid if such goods are expected and intended to
be resold by the mortgagor? Not necessarily; in Solter v.
MacMillan9 the Court refused to hold that after-acquired
furniture and office equipment which was not acquired for
purpose of resale was subject to the mortgage.
If the mortgage provides that the proceeds of a sale of
the mortgaged goods will be invested in after-acquired
goods to be subject to the mortgage, will this type of mort-
gage be upheld? Not necessarily. Although the Court in
Hamilton v. Rogers"0 mentioned that Justice Story was of
the opinion that the principle invalidating a mortgage of
after-acquired property did not apply to property acquired
by the mortgagor with the consent of the mortgagee, in
conformity with the original agreement, by a reinvest-
ment of the proceeds of the original property, the Court
in this case did not find it necessary to apply this principle,
as there was no evidence that any of the after-acquired
property had been purchaesd by such proceeds. Shortly
after this case in Rose v. Bevan"' the Court decided that
the fact that the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged
goods are reinvested in future goods did not make the
future goods subject to the earlier mortgage.
Have the courts in Maryland ever upheld a provision
in a mortgage which purports to cover after-acquired goods
that are to be part of the mortgagor's stock in trade for
resale? Although there are cases invalidating such pro-
visions, the writer has been unable to find any written
opinion upholding such a provision. 2
Does the Maryland recording statute6 3 by its express
language prohibit a mortgage on after-acquired personal
property? In Crocker v. Hopps6 4 it was said that such a
provision is in direct conflict with the express language
of Article 21, Section 4065 that "no personal property of any
77 Md. 100, 26 A. 501 (1893) ; see supra, circa n. 42.
147 Md. 580, 128 A. 356 (1925) ; see aupra, circa u. 45.
0 8 Md. 301 (1855) ; see supra, circa ns. 3 and 8.
6110 Md. 466 (1857) ; see 8upra, circa n. 4,
In passing, attention might be called to the Factor's Lien statutes,
1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 2, §§ 21-29 inclusive, particularly §§ 22 and 23.
For inventory financing of after-acquired property, see Stiller, Inventory
and Accounts Receivable Financing: The Maryland Maze, 18 Md. L. Rev.
185, particularly pages 224-233 (1958).
62 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 41.
78 Md. 260, 28 A. 99 (1893) ; see supra, circa n. 5.
6 Now, with certain amendments, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 41.
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description whatever, whereof the vendor, mortgagor or
donor shall remain in possession shall pass .... ." However,
a mortgage on future crops was recognized in Ober v.
Keating" on equitable principles, but stricken down only
because of failure to record.
Are mortgages of after-acquired property against public
policy? Apparently not, because sometimes such mort-
gages have been upheld by the courts and also occasionally
have been given legislative sanction."
Are there any reasons why the law should be timid in
upholding mortgages of after-acquired property? Possibly
a feeling that a necessitous debtor might mortgage himself
into what might amount to almost a state of refined
peonage.6 8 Also, possibly a feeling that the matter could
get out of hand and cause considerable confusion as to the
ownership of property and in effect be a fraud on third
persons, such as creditors, who dealt with the mortgagor
in possession."
The curious thing to the writer is, that as far as case
law goes, although it is perhaps difficult from the decisions
to set down a more or less infallible test as to when the
courts will uphold or invalidate an attempt to mortgage
after-acquired property, no particular decision in its end
result seems conspicuously wrong.
At the moment, if the writer were a judge and had the
privilege of establishing a pattern, unbound by precedent,
he might try something like this as the test to be used,
possibly calling it the "seriatim" test:
Today A executes a mortgage on his present property,
real or personal to secure B, which is properly recorded.
Tomorrow A executes another mortgage on property which
he has acquired since yesterday to secure further the same
debt he owes B, which is also properly recorded. Six
months from this last mortgage, A once again executes a
mortgage on property which he has acquired since the last
mortgage to still secure further the same debt he owes B,
which is also properly recorded.
In the litigation that comes before him, would he up-
hold these three mortgages against the claims of third per-
sons such as creditors of A? Perhaps if these mortgages
- 77 Md. 100, 26 A. 501 (1893).
e Butler v. Rahm, 46 Md. 541 (1877) ; Brady v. Johnson, 75 Md. 445, 26
A. 49 (1892), and also 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 60, discussed infra,
circa n. 74.
68 Cohen and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 Univ. of Pa.
L. Rev. 635 (1939).
'VOLD, SALES (1931) 103.
[VOL. XIX
1959] AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY LIENS 315
were on a stock in trade which he knew that A was going
to sell and use the proceeds for his own purposes and not
to liquidate the mortgage debt, he would hold these mort-
gages invalid as to other creditors of A even though each
mortgage when executed was on property owned by A
when the respective mortgage was executed. On the other
hand, if the property subject to these mortgages were not
merchandise intended for resale with A exercising do-
minion and control over the proceeds, then perhaps he
would hold that these mortgages created a valid lien. It
will be noted here that by using the series of mortgages
to secure the same debt test, the problem of after-acquired
property has not been involved and the validity or in-
validity of the mortgages has been decided on other fac-
tors, such as, perhaps, fraud on creditors.
Now let us take the same parties. Today A wishes to
borrow money or obtain credit from B. Instead of planning
to give a series of mortgages with the repetitive paper
work and recording, they undertake to accomplish the
same result by executing only one mortgage but to pro-
vide an after-acquired property clause in the mortgage,
and the instrument is properly recorded. This mortgage
is now before the writer in litigation to decide the validity
or invalidity of the after-acquired property clause. The
result should be the same as if there were a series of mort-
gages as set out above. If the series of mortgages would be
upheld, then the after-acquired property clause would be
upheld; if the series would be held invalid, then the after-
acquired property clause would be held invalid.
Another way, apparently, to clarify the problem of
after-acquired property as security is by statute. In the
leading Maryland case, Hamilton v. Rogers, ° in the course
of its opinion, the Court said:
"Looking to the maxims of the common law and the
decisions of courts, both in this country and in Eng-
land, we are clearly of the opinion, that this action
cannot be maintained for the taking of subsequently
acquired goods. If, for the convenience of the com-
munity, or the benefit of trade and commerce, it be
deemed important that the rules of law in this par-
ticular should be altered, the legislature is the proper
branch of the government to which the application
should be made for that purpose. As the law now is,
there can scarcely be a doubt that in some instances
loss and injury are suffered by those who are least
08 Md. 301 (1855).
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deserving of it. Courts cannot prevent it, for the rules
of law are, and have been from the earliest times,
inexorable. 7 1
And in Butler v. Rahm72 to the objection that the mort-
gage attempted to convey future-to-be-acquired property,
the Court said:
"... . the mortgage is, in our judgment, free from
objection in its terms and provisions; it was made with
the legislative sanction, and appears to be in all re-
spects such a contract as was contemplated and au-
thorized by the charter of the company. 7
3
In 1935, in legislation, which apparently grew out of
the great economic depression of the late 1920's and the
early 1930's, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted
Chapter 281 of the 1935 Laws74 sanctioning the creation of
chattel and crop mortgages by any person, association,
partnership, or corporation with a Production Credit Asso-
ciation or a Bank for Cooperatives organized under the
Farm Credit Act of 1933, a Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, or
the Government of the United States or any Institution
which has made arrangements to discount therewith, or to
procure funds therefrom on the security of the obligations
of the Borrower, and may secure the repayment of the
funds so borrowed, and/or any of them existing or future
indebtedness to such institution by chattel mortgage upon
7 Ibid., 320. Although Maryland has not enacted the Uniform Ciommer-
cial Code proposed by the American Law Institute and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it might be of Interest
to note that Article 9 of the said Code (Secured Transactions) makes
provisions for after-acquired chattel property as security with certain
limitations. Note particularly Section 9-204 and the Comment thereunder.
7246 Md. 541 (1877).
7 Ibid., 548. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 9, provides, among other things:
"Every corporation of this State shall have the following general
powers, except where special provisions of law relating to corporations
of that particular class are inconsistent herewith: ....
"(5) To make contracts, incur liabilities, and borrow money; to
sell, mortgage, lease, pledge, exchange, convey, transfer, and other-
wise dispose of all or any part of its pr operty and assets; to issue
bonds, notes and other obligations and secure the same by mortgage
or deed of trust of all or any part of its property, franchises and
income."
Is the language "mortgage ... all or any part of its property and assets;
to issue bonds, notes and other obligations and secure the same by mortgage
or deed of trust of all or any part of its property," broad enough to include
after-acquired property? The writer has found no case construing this
section on this point but it may be arguable that this language is broad
enough to include the power to mortgage after-acquired property of the
corporation.
1 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, §§ 52-65.
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personal property of any kind, character or description
owned at the time of the execution of the mortgage, or
property of the same class as is covered by the mortgagor
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage and prior to
its extinguishment, and/or upon crop or crops, annual or
perennial, including fruit crops, grown or growing, either
already planted or to be planted and/or maturing within
one year from the execution of such mortgage. Such mort-
gage shall be a lien upon the property therein described
from the time of the docketing of such mortgage as pro-
vided for herein, etc.
The Act made provision for docketing in the clerks
office of the Circuit Courts for the counties and the
Superior Court of Baltimore City in a book to be known
as "Federal Farm Credit Lien Book".
It will be noted here that the statute authorized mort-
gages to include after-acquired chattel property and future
crops. It is to be noted at this point that the statute was
apparently limited in scope to mortgages in which some
Federal agency was to be the mortgagee and that the book
in which the mortgages were to be recorded indicated
further by its title a limited scope.
In correspondence dated December 31, 1934, addressed
to the General Counsel of the Farm Credit Administration
in Washington, D.C., it was stated:
"We are particularly desirous of having special
chattel and crop mortgage laws enacted in the States
of West Virginia and Maryland, in order to accomplish
the following purposes:
(1) To provide that such mortgages executed to
the governmental agencies may extend to fu-
ture as well as existing debts.
(2) To provide for the covering of after-acquired
property of the same class as is covered by the
chattel deed of trust or mortgage.
(3) To provide for the mortgage of perennial crops
including fruit crops.
(4) To specifically provide that for the purposes
of the act crops shall be deemed personal
property and that the liens on crops obtained
under the act shall be superior to judgments
or other liens on the real estate. The purpose
of this provision is to eliminate the necessity
of obtaining waivers from the holders of such
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
liens on real estate and thus expedite and
facilitate the closing of loans.
(5) To provide that although the making of future
advances may be optional, the lien of the chat-
tel mortgage or deed of trust shall date from
the time of recording the instrument, so that
title search will be unnecessary at the time of
making of future advances.
(6) To provide that the lien of the chattel mort-
gage or deed of trust shall extend to replace-
ments of the encumbered property.
(7) To provide for coverage of all increase of
animals and livestock of all kinds.
(8) To provide for docketing instead of recording
of instruments in order that it will be neces-
sary to execute only one instrument, even
though crops and other chattels constitute the
security and in order to reduce the work of
the clerks of the court and the fees payable
to them.
(9) To provide for marginal assignments and re-
leases at a small cost. Under the law, as
drafted for West Virginia, there will be a
minimum saving of $1.25 in the cost of obtain-
ing the lien and in Maryland, a saving of as
high as $5.00.
(10) To provide for preservation of the lien even
though the encumbered property is removed
from the county in which the deed of trust or
mortgage is docketed.
(11) To provide that upon default the beneficiary
or trustee shall have the right of possession
without process of law.
(12) To provide for a more speedy method of fore-
closure." 5
This legislation was enacted to make possible the ex-
tension of credit to farmers and the model draft was pre-
pared by the Farm Credit Administration for enactment
The writer is indebted to Clarence A. Patters6n, Esq., General Counsel
for the Farm Credit Banks of Baltimore and also 'Joseph Patti, Esq., )f
the same office for their courtesy and cooperation In making available to
the writer the files from which the above information was obtained.
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by the state legislatures if the latter cared to use such
drafts as a model. However, subsequently, by Chapter 381
of the Laws of 1945, the statute was amended to broaden
the organizations which could be the mortgagee to include
also any National Bank, State Bank, Savings Bank or Trust
Company, and the name of the recording book was changed
to be known as "Credit Lien Book".
On the face of these statutes it would now appear that
a debtor may, if he select one of the enumerated organiza-
tions as a mortgagee create a valid mortgage on after-
acquired personal property of the same type as that pres-
ently owned. And it is to be noted that there is nothing
on the face of the statutes to limit the mortgagors to being
farmers. It is probably true that as long as government
agencies are the mortgagees under the laws and regula-
tions governing these agencies only farmers could avail
themselves of these statutes. However, since the amend-
ment of 1945 also includes any National Bank, State Bank
and Savings Bank or Trust Company as mortgagees, are
these statutes any longer confined only to mortgagors who
are engaged in farming? Cannot now, the merchant, manu-
facturer or any non-farmer, avail himself of the benefits of
this statute and obtain loans or credit on the security of
after-acquired property? Granting that the statute was
originally intended only for farm mortgages, is it not
significant that, at the same time the class of mortgagees
was broadened, the legislature changed the name of the
recording book from "Federal Farm Credit Lien Book" to
the less limited title of merely "Credit Lien Book"?
If these statutes are now available to everybody and
not confined merely to farmers, then in this State it seems
we are presently operating under a dual system of mort-
gage law where if the mortgagee and mortgagor select the
historical system the mortgage on after-acquired property
may be invalidated but if they elect to execute under the
statutory system it apparently will not generally be in-
validated. In fact, the decision may turn on the question
as to whether the mortgage is recorded in the "Chattel
Records" book as provided in Article 17, Section 50, or the
"Credit Lien Book" as provided in Article 21, Section 58.
As the Court of Appeals stated in a recent opinion:76
"Thus it appears that the law on this question is
not as clear and settled in Maryland as might be
desired."
' Weiprecht v. Ripple, 217 Md. 337, 345, 143 A. 2d 62 (1958).
